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LESSONS FOR BUFFETT’S SUCCESSORS, 
PEERS, AND POLICY 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham 
Berkshire Hathaway’s unique managerial model is lauded 
for its great value; this Article highlights its costs. Most costs 
stem from the same features that yield such great value, 
which boil down, ironically, to Berkshire trying to be 
something it isn’t: it is a massive industrial conglomerate run 
as an old-fashioned investment partnership. An advisory 
board gives unchecked power to a single manager (Warren 
Buffett); Buffett makes huge capital allocations and pivotal 
executive hiring-and-firing decisions with modest 
investigation and scant oversight; Berkshire’s autonomous 
and decentralized structure grants operating managers 
enormous discretion with limited second-guessing; its trust-
based culture relies on a cultivated vision of integrity more 
than internal controls; and its thrifty anti-bureaucracy means 
no central departments, such as public relations or general 
counsel. 
Delineating the visible costs of Berkshire’s model confirms 
the desirability of tolerating many of them, given the value 
concurrently generated, but also reveals ways to improve the 
model—a few while Buffett is at the helm, but mostly for 
successors. Current reform suggestions include hiring a full-
time public relations professional at headquarters and more 
systematically developing senior executives; suggestions for 
future reform include enhanced subsidiary compliance 
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resources and separating the identity and personal opinions 
of top executives from the corporation and its official policy. 
Besides helping Berkshire, the review and suggestions will 
help managers of other companies inspired by Buffett’s 
unique managerial model and policymakers who should 
study it. Implications for peers and policymakers include 
highlighting flexibility in corporate governance, the efficacy of 
the conglomerate form, and especially the value of strategies 
that produce long-term thinking among shareholders and 
managers alike. 
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 “We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad 
decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from 
decisions made too slowly—or not at all—because of a stifling 
bureaucracy.” 
 
     —Warren Buffett, 2009 Letter to Shareholders 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the visible costs of Berkshire 
Hathaway’s (“Berkshire” or “BRK”) unique managerial 
model, highlighting the lessons for Berkshire and the 
implications for peers and policymakers. Most such costs 
derive from the same features that have produced 
substantial value at Berkshire, which ironically are due to 
Berkshire trying to be something it is not: Warren Buffett’s 
giant industrial conglomerate is organized and operated as if 
it were still the old-fashioned investment partnership of its 
early years. Costs arise from the empowerment of a single 
individual to make multi-billion dollar decisions with scant 
oversight, devolution of operating decisions to disparate 
individuals running its scores of diverse subsidiaries, and a 
culture based on a cultivated sense of integrity rather than 
conventional internal controls. While the net benefits are 
vast, tallying the costs illuminates how the model might be 
improved, especially after Buffett leaves the scene in the 
next decade or so. 
The most visible—and measurable—costs of the 
Berkshire model appear in capital allocation, principally 
acquisitions and investments. Buffett relies on himself in 
making these decisions, without board or executive input or 
oversight. While most such decisions have succeeded, many 
spectacularly so, some bloopers have appeared, the best-
known being Dexter Shoe and Gen Re. The costs of error 
from such self-reliance could readily be mitigated by broader 
distribution of decision-making power. Buffett does so by 
periodically consulting vice chairman Charles Munger. Yet 
since the net costs of this approach have been modest, 
thanks to Buffett’s acumen and stature, there is no reason 
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for reform while Buffett is at the helm. But some additional 
power-sharing and oversight would be appropriate for his 
successors, as Berkshire’s succession plan contemplates. 
The more dramatic costs of the Berkshire model arise 
from executive departures and succession at the subsidiaries. 
While most Berkshire managers have excelled and the 
company generally retains managers for lengthy tenures, 
there are exceptions that become costly because they suggest 
crisis. The stakes have been particularly high on the 
occasions involving executives considered likely successors to 
Buffett, such as David Sokol and Richard Santulli. The 
drama of Berkshire executive shuffles arises in part from 
Buffett being the company’s sole decision maker, but it is 
magnified by Berkshire’s lack of formal vetting, training, 
grooming, and talent review protocols. This problem should 
be remedied now, while Buffett is at the helm, and there is 
evidence of increased coordination and discussion among 
Berkshire subsidiary chief executive officers (“CEOs”), which 
should intensify as Berkshire moves beyond Buffett. 
Berkshire’s decentralized structure produces a third 
category of costs, those inflicted on customers or employees. 
At a sprawling business organization with hundreds of units 
and hundreds of thousands of employees, such externalities 
are inevitable. Known historical examples at specific 
Berkshire subsidiaries include questionable practices of 
certain distributors of Kirby vacuums and inhumane 
conditions at Fruit of the Loom’s overseas manufacturing 
facilities. More generally, consumer advocates critique some 
products that Berkshire companies and investees market—
such as See’s candies, Coca-Cola’s carbonated beverages, and 
Kraft’s processed foods.1 Labor advocates challenge 
treatment of the workforce by co-investors, especially by 3G, 
 
1 See, e.g., Zachary Tracer, Kraft a Menu at the Buffett Buffet With 
Warren’s Latest Deal, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 25, 2015), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/kraft-a-menu-at-the-buffett-
buffet-with-warren-s-latest-deal [http://perma.cc/LQU3-DJPA]; Kyle Stock, 
Warren Buffett is Bad for Your Health, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/warren-buffett-is-bad-
for-your-health [http://perma.cc/5658-HSQN]. 
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the Brazilian private equity firm with which Berkshire has 
co-invested in H.J. Heinz and Kraft. While such costs are 
tolerable with Buffett at the helm, and the benefits of 
decentralization should be sustained once he’s gone, 
Berkshire will need to invest more resources in 
conglomerate-wide internal control and reporting in the 
coming years. 
Subtler costs arise from Berkshire’s zealous thriftiness 
that leave it without a centralized communications or public 
relations department. Given Berkshire’s scale and reach, 
however, along with relatively opaque disclosure about many 
operations, it attracts investigative journalists targeting 
subsidiaries for critical exposure and sometimes political or 
legal advantage. Subsidiaries as diverse as National 
Indemnity and Clayton Homes appeared flatfooted as targets 
of corporate exposés, in part because of Berkshire’s lack of a 
centralized communications or public relations department.2 
Respecting as laudable the thrifty anti-bureaucratic impulse, 
the company would nevertheless do well now to hire a 
professional to handle Berkshire’s overall public relations, 
for both parent-level communications and to coordinate that 
of subsidiaries. 
The most significant historical cost of the Berkshire 
model has been widespread treatment of Berkshire as 
Buffett’s alter ego, a natural propensity given his long-time 
controlling ownership and dominating leadership. It became 
a cost, however, as Buffett became outspoken in offering his 
personal views on a range of hot topics on which Berkshire 
may act differently—or critics so perceive, and charge 
hypocrisy. Examples: Buffett urges more progressive 
taxation while Berkshire pursues tax-advantaged 
transactions;3 Buffett criticizes financial intermediaries 
 
2 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett and Wall Street: The 
Best of Frenemies, FIN. HIST., Fall 2015, at 16, http://www.moaf.org/ 
publications-collections/financial-history-magazine/115/_res/id=sa_File1/ 
Warren%20Buffett%20and%20Wall%20Street.pdf [http://perma.cc/497D-
DV5Q]; infra text accompanying notes 60–99. 
3 See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Burger King, Warren Buffett Under Fire 
for Canadian Inversion Deal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www. 
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while Berkshire’s portfolio holds substantial stakes in them;4 
and Buffett publicly stated his support for the Keystone oil 
pipeline despite how it would compete with Berkshire’s 
BNSF Railway.5 
Although these costs cannot be tackled with Buffett at 
Berkshire’s helm, successors can avoid them by reticence—
executive behavior that clearly distinguishes the company 
from its personnel, including refraining from offering 
personal opinions in public debates. Another cost of this alter 
ego phenomenon, which has received the greatest publicity, 
is the most intractable: concern about the fate of the 
company, after the man passes. 
To summarize, the principal sources of the costs of 
Berkshire’s model are self-reliance, a culture of autonomy 
and trust, decentralization, thrift, and alter ego. Resulting 
costs may be categorized as the costs of error, crisis, 
externalities, reputation, and uncertainty. Corrective 
measures to enact now are incrementally greater leadership 
coordination, increased grooming to minimize the costs of 
succession crises, and hiring of a professional public 
relations expert to protect reputation. Measures to enact in 
due course are slightly wider sharing of decision-making 
power over capital allocation to neutralize error risk; modest 
strengthening of internal reporting controls to police against 
externalities; and maintenance of executive reticence on 
matters of public policy to avoid the costs of treating 
Berkshire’s leadership as synonymous with the company. 
 
latimes.com/business/la-fi-burger-king-tim-hortons-boyctott-warren-
buffett-20140826-story.html [http://perma.cc/PG8B-Y8NP]; infra text 
accompanying notes 100–15. 
4 See Dale A. Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of the ’80s 
Through the Letters of Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 573–77 
(1997); see also infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
5 See Stephen Gandel, Warren Buffett: “I Would Have Passed 
Keystone,” FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/02/warren-
buffett-i-would-have-passed-keystone/ [https://perma.cc/WM9Y-5ZED]; 
Jeremy Bowman, Did Obama Just Do Warren Buffett and Railroad Stocks 
a Huge Favor? MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.fool.com/ 
investing/general/2015/03/08/obama-did-warren-buffett-railroad-stocks-
huge-favo.aspx [http://perma.cc/F6W9-47VH]. 
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The Berkshire model offers lessons for other companies 
and policymakers. Given the model’s substantial net success, 
a fundamental prescription is to allow corporations broad 
leeway in governance design and organizational structure. In 
their modesty, Berkshire’s specific blemishes reaffirm the 
value of such latitude while attesting to the general appeal of 
the type—but not the degree—of prevailing governance 
regulation or practice. Leading examples are having some 
deliberative body such as a board, but accepting the 
traditional advisory model rather than insisting on the 
contemporary monitoring model; allowing even iconic chief 
executives significant, if restrained, autonomy; leaving 
substantial room for trust as the basis of an organization, 
complemented by controls tailored to internal needs rather 
than imposed by general regulation; and permitting the 
conglomerate form of organization to flourish under 
conditions such as those Berkshire has nurtured while 
assuring the capacity for such institutions to defend 
themselves against hostile onslaught by corporate raiders or 
shareholder activists. 
II. ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR BERKSHIRE 
As the ensuing chart tabulates, the following discussion 
catalogues the costs of Berkshire’s model as arising from five 
traits—self-reliance, autonomy, decentralization, thrift, and 
alter ego. Each trait’s costs are presented in the context 
where they manifest most saliently and are accompanied by 
specific illustrations. A prescription concludes each section, 
principally discussing whether to adjust the trait now or 
after Buffett leaves the scene. In a couple of miscellaneous 
settings, tolerance is the best prescription.  
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Table 1: Costs of Berkshire’s Blemishes vs. Modest 
Prescriptions 
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A. Error Risks of Self-Reliance in Capital Allocation 
Buffett calls all parent-level shots at Berkshire, on his 
own, with limited investigation and no oversight, especially 
concerning acquisitions and investments. Unlike most 
sizable public companies, Berkshire relies on neither its 
board of directors nor senior executives to approve 
acquisitions, nor does it utilize outside advisors to vet deals. 
Buffett explains his general philosophy to the board but 
rarely seeks its advance approval; he occasionally consults 
with vice chairman Charles Munger ahead of time, but not 
always, and he does not always heed Munger’s counsel.6 
Berkshire rarely uses business brokers or investment 
bankers to find acquisition targets, but rather relies on an 
informal network of friends and business associates.7 Most 
suggestions work out well, but not all, entailing some costs of 
error. 
One of Berkshire’s most unusual acquisitions occurred in 
2001, when Buffett’s friend, Julian Robertson, founder of the 
preeminent Tiger Fund, signaled to Buffett his willingness to 
sell a large stake in XTRA, the truck leasing company.8 
 
6 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE 
ENDURING VALUE OF VALUES 213 (2014) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, 
BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s 
Disintermediation: Buffett’s New Managerial Model, 50 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 509, 516 (2015). 
7 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 213. 
8 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, 
Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 28, 2002), 
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Buffett upped the ante, proposing to XTRA’s board the 
making of a tender offer to its shareholders, which it 
endorsed, and Berkshire soon closed the deal. Contrary to 
Berkshire’s usual practice of maintaining both management 
and operations after an acquisition, within three years, 
XTRA replaced its CEO, relocated its headquarters, and 
divested a large part of its asset base.9 While such drastic 
steps are commonly part of the plan of many corporate 
acquisitions, they are avoided under the Berkshire model. So 
when such steps are taken at Berkshire—in this case to 
reduce overhead, improve asset utilization, and boost 
profits—they are anomalies that can prove costly. Their 
origin is in the informality of Berkshire acquisitions, 
especially spontaneously acting on tips by friends and 
associates and conducting scant due diligence. 
While XTRA turned out to be a profitable acquisition, 
another unusual deal posed disastrous financial results: 
Berkshire’s 1993 acquisition of Dexter Shoe. Berkshire paid 
$443 million—all in Berkshire stock—for the dying New 
England shoemaker.10 The company had been a dynamo, 
producing millions of shoes in local factories annually. 
Dexter maintained production in the United States, paying 
higher wages than rivals and outdid imports from low-wage 
countries in terms of quality and style. 
Despite positive traits, Dexter had a big latent negative: 
manufacturing costs in the United States were ten times 
those in China.11 Eventually, rivals produced shoes as good 
as Dexter’s but at one-tenth the cost. By 2007, Buffett 
confessed that acquiring Dexter was the worst deal he ever 




9 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 212. 
10 Jonathan Stempel, Buffett Calls Dexter Shoe His Worst Deal Ever, 
REUTERS (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/01/us-
berkshire-buffett-failure-idUSN2921504820080301 [http://perma.cc/A99H-
4NHE]. 
11 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 29. 
12 Stempel, supra note 10. 
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the Berkshire stock surrendered, by 2015 nearing an eye-
popping $6 billion, teaching the perils of using a high quality 
stock like Berkshire to acquire businesses.13 
Buffett alone made the mistake—without input from the 
Berkshire board or his inner circle. One lesson: even the 
greatest investors and decision makers make costly 
mistakes. Buffett is aware of this, of course, which is why he 
often vets proposals with Munger. But while Buffett values 
Munger’s counsel to veto a deal—earning Munger the 
nickname the “Abominable No Man”—Buffett has not always 
listened, as the even more costly acquisition of Gen Re 
attests. 
In 1999, Berkshire paid $22 billion for Gen Re—all in 
Berkshire stock (the lesson from Dexter to avoid paying in 
stock did not appear until 2007).14 Buffett and Munger knew 
that Gen Re, a large reinsurer, maintained a significant 
derivatives business that posed considerable risk. While 
Munger suggested avoiding the deal, Buffett figured he 
would direct managers to close that business unit promptly 
after closing the deal. But once Berkshire acquired Gen Re, 
the managers did not do so and, consistent with Buffett’s 
hands-off approach, he did not push them (such reluctance 
underscores how unusual the post-acquisition shuffles at 
XTRA were).15 
Besides patent problems of the derivatives business, more 
latent challenges also beset Gen Re’s wider operations. 
Buffett had known Ronald Ferguson, Gen Re’s chief 
executive, for many years, and apparently relied heavily on 
Ferguson’s personal knowledge and experience. What 
neither Buffett nor Ferguson knew, however, was that Gen 
 
13 The real cost was greater than the $443 million purchase price 
since it was paid in Berkshire stock. The stock paid represented 1.6 
percent of Berkshire, which in 2007 would have been worth $3.5 billion. 
14 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
and General Re Corporation to Merge (June 19, 1998), http://www. 
berkshirehathaway.com/news/jun1998.html [http://perma.cc/C7V7-8GJW]. 
15 WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF 
WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 151, 155–57 (4th ed. 
2016) [hereinafter THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT]. 
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Re’s underwriting discipline and reserving had slipped.16 It 
had under-reserved for risks it covered, which underwriters 
translated into low prices on subsequent policies. The firm 
pursued business it should have rejected, including undue 
concentration in particular risks. From 1999 to 2001, Gen Re 
incurred underwriting losses totaling $6.1 billion; unwinding 
the derivatives business was both costly and protracted, 
causing Buffett angst for many years.17 
Berkshire shareholders voted to approve the Gen Re 
transaction,18 a vote required because it was structured as a 
merger, with Berkshire transferring shares to Gen Re 
holders—unusual features for a Berkshire deal, most of 
which are acquisitions for cash, which do not require 
shareholder approval. While shareholder votes can check 
improvident deals, the Berkshire-Gen Re merger sailed 
through. True, shareholders of many companies often 
approve improvident mergers due to ignorance or apathy, 
but Berkshire shareholders are savvy and seen as partners. 
Yet, despite such hallmarks, Berkshire’s shareholders 
remain holders of corporate equity, not partners, and are 
therefore prone to error. Thus, there is a cost of overstating 
the significance of Berkshire’s shareholder body. The 
 
16 Oversight may have been lax too, as a subsequent criminal case 
against Ferguson and other Gen Re executives questioned the legitimacy 
of a high-level insurance contract that, prosecutors said, was arranged to 
facilitate financial fraud by the counterparty, American International 
Group (“AIG”). See Noah A. Gold, Corporate Criminal Liability: Cooperate, 
and You Won’t Be Indicted, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 148–52 (2010). 
The case led to the resignation of both Ferguson and his successor, Joseph 
Brandon. Id. In a book I wrote with former AIG chairman Hank 
Greenberg, however, we explained why such allegations were without 
merit and the related investigations flawed. MAURICE R. GREENBERG & 
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY 177–79, 185 (2013). 
17 Mark A. Hoffman, Warren Buffett Accepts Blame for General Re’s 
Poor Results, BUS. INS. (Mar. 17, 2002), http://www.businessinsurance 
.com/article/20020317/ISSUE01/10009254/warren-buffett-accepts-blame-
for-general-res-poor-results [http://perma.cc/P2X5-ZC4P]; Steve Jordon, 
General Re is the Key to Berkshire’s Ignition, Underwriting Losses, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, at 1. 
18 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, supra note 14. 
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shareholders cannot be counted on to veto improvident deals 
Buffett proposes. 
Munger is not only influential, sometimes vetoing deals, 
but deferential, when Buffett wishes to proceed anyway. In 
2007, Buffett invested $2 billion in the debt of a leveraged 
buyout of Texas electric utilities. It soon busted amid the 
financial crisis, costing Berkshire almost $900 million.19 
Reporting this in 2013, Buffett wrote, “Next time I’ll call 
Charlie.”20 While investment committees, common at most 
businesses even fractions of Berkshire’s size, limit 
opportunistic capital allocation, instances like this 
underscore the cost of a one-man investment committee. 
Buffett understands the appeal and limits of the model 
and seems to believe that others besides him can execute it. 
On the other hand, the Berkshire succession plan envisions 
splitting the roles of chief executive and chief investment 
officer and the roles of management from board chairman. 
Accordingly, the Berkshire succession plan envisions a 
somewhat tighter leash on Buffett’s successor—and, 
unusually for Berkshire, joins a trendy feature in 
contemporary governance of splitting the roles of board 
chairman and chief executive.21 That outcome should be 
continually monitored by Berkshire’s board, which should be 
willing to loosen or tighten it, even if incrementally, as may 
be indicated by performance from time to time.22 
 
19 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, 




21 See Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board 
Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 73 (2010). 
22 For other firms, addressed more fully in Part II below, insisting on 
a capable decision maker based on core principles and a proven track 
record seems imperative before opting to follow the Berkshire model. See 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Secret Sauce of Corporate Leadership, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawrence-a-
cunningham-the-secret-sauce-of-corporate-leadership-1422231824 [http:// 
perma.cc/UET3-K3C7]. At minimum, they should embrace the 
fundamental Berkshire-Buffett tenet of the circle of competence—
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B. Crisis Costs in Severing Autonomous Executives 
The costs of Berkshire’s management structure are most 
dramatic when senior executives depart after being ensnared 
in widely-publicized imbroglios. The problems generally 
arise, in varying degrees, from Berkshire’s lack of any formal 
program of executive recruiting, vetting, talent review, or 
succession grooming. Buffett pays close attention to manager 
identity when acquiring a company, but then relies on such 
managers to appoint successors. At the same time, there is 
no middle management, so in modern management parlance, 
a single person has some eighty direct reports. The chief 
costs are from mistakenly releasing or retaining senior 
executives in circumstances that suggest crisis.23 
Crisis was the hallmark of a series of executive shuffles at 
Berkshire’s NetJets subsidiary, which involved two 
managers on the short list of Buffett successors, Richard 
Santulli and David Sokol. NetJets, which Santulli founded 
and led through 2009, is a competitive and capital intensive 
business with a unionized employee base.24 Selling fractional 
interests in private aircraft to the elite, Santulli conceived of 
the business as a luxury brand and operated it accordingly. 
But the company struggled and, amid economic adversity 
following the 2008 financial crisis, Buffett decided to make a 
change. Why he did so remains something of a mystery and 
certainly an anomaly, however, as Buffett rarely second-
guesses managers, especially company founders like 
Santulli. 
As NetJets’ new CEO, Buffett appointed Sokol, who 
perceived NetJets to be bloated and forthwith cut costs 
 
allocating capital only to undertakings clearly within the decision maker’s 
capabilities. 
23 In addition to the examples of executive succession amid crisis 
described in this Part, two others occurred in succession at Gen Re amid 
questions about the legality of a high-level insurance contract with AIG. 
See supra note 16. 
24 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 24, 
91–92. 
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aggressively.25 Unionized employees were furious and a 
sense of crisis soon engulfed the company. Why Buffett chose 
Sokol to run NetJets is also a curiosity. Sokol was running 
Berkshire Hathaway’s energy business (then called Mid-
American Energy) and troubleshooting as board chairman at 
Johns Manville. Buffett has almost never moved a CEO from 
one Berkshire company to another.26 Having the same CEO 
run two Berkshire companies was unprecedented. But 
Buffett had grown to trust Sokol immensely, having been 
introduced to him by one of his most intimate confidants, 
Walter Scott, a fellow Omaha denizen and Berkshire board 
member. Buffett’s faith, however, was misplaced, as Sokol 
resigned from all his Berkshire jobs in 2011 after being 
caught front running—he was accused of insider trading 
when he bought stock in a public company, Lubrizol, ahead 
of pitching it to Buffett as a Berkshire acquisition.27 
At NetJets, Sokol left behind both his cost-cutting 
business model and a successor, Jordan Hansell.28 Sokol had 
recruited Hansell from Berkshire’s energy business, where 
Hansell had served as general counsel.29 NetJets’ pilots loved 
Santulli and lamented his departure; they detested both 
Sokol and Hansell, and especially their low-cost strategy.30 
 
25 Geraldine Fabrikant, Potential Successor to Buffett Has Tough 
Task, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 3, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/04/potential-buffett-successor-has-tough-task [http://perma.cc/UE 
R9-FDN8]. 
26 See Charles Munger, Munger on ‘The Berkshire System,’ in THE 
ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 299, 300. 
27 See Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading, 
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 402 (2013). 
28 Noah Buhayar & Mary Jane Credeur, Sokol Exit Makes Hansell 





30 Marla Matzer Rose, Union Workers Upset with NetJets, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/ 
2011/12/09/union-workers-upset-with-netjets.html [http://perma.cc/9CCY-
CBWA]. 
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After Santulli left, management-labor relations deteriorated, 
and during 2013 to 2014 the pilots’ union hurled invective at 
Hansell in aggressive campaigns from the internet to The 
Wall Street Journal and Omaha World-Herald.31 Pilots 
picketed outside Berkshire’s annual meeting in 2014 and 
2015. Amid mounting turmoil, in early 2015, Hansell 
resigned and two Santulli-era executives who left from 
NetJets earlier that year were recruited back to lead the 
company.32 
From these circumstances, it is tempting to infer that 
Berkshire’s acquisition of NetJets was a mistake—and 
perhaps it belongs in the prior section’s list of costly 
acquisitions that are due to Buffett being Berkshire’s sole 
decision maker. But it also speaks to the lack of any formal 
programs at Berkshire concerning executive recruiting, 
review, promotion, or grooming. Sokol had no experience 
with fractional aviation or much else relevant to leading 
NetJets, such as consumer or union relations. Sokol selected 
Hansell, a young lawyer at the energy company, who 
likewise lacked obviously relevant credentials or experience. 
The Sokol episode also revealed other costs about crisis 
management at Berkshire. After Buffett learned of Sokol’s 
front running, he drafted a press release that drew sharp 
criticism, as it spoke of “extraordinary” contributions to 
Berkshire and gave Buffett’s opinion that Sokol had done 
nothing illegal.33 Buffett accepted the criticism34 and then 
 
31 See NetJets: Lining CEO Pockets at Expense of Pilot Livelihoods, 
GENUINEQS, http://www.genuineqs.com/qs_ads.html [http://perma.cc/5X 
BT-DL59]. 
32 Lawrence Cunningham, Was NetJets Purchase a Mistake for 
Warren Buffett, BETTY LIU SHOW (June 1, 2015), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-06-01/was-netjets-purchase-a-mistake-
for-warren-buffett- [http://perma.cc/X4GX-9G9U]. 
33 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, Warren E. Buffett, CEO of 
Berkshire Hathaway, Announces the Resignation of David L. Sokol (Mar. 
30, 2011), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/mar3011.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5GZ2-AWQD]. 
34 Ben Claremon, Notes from the 2011 Berkshire Annual Meeting, THE 
INOCULATED INVESTOR (May 2, 2011), http://investing.kuchita.com/wp-
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turned the matter over to Berkshire’s board audit committee 
which, with assistance from the law firm Munger, Tolles & 
Olson LLP, condemned Sokol for violating Berkshire policies. 
The executive shuffles at NetJets resembled successive 
shuffles at Berkshire’s Benjamin Moore paint manufacturing 
subsidiary. When Berkshire acquired it in 2000, Buffett 
personally promised to continue its longstanding practice of 
selling only through independent distributors, despite the 
rise of powerful big box retailers such as Home Depot and 
Lowe’s.35 By 2012, however, after five years at the helm, 
Denis Abrams was replaced for planning to sell paint 
through such retailers.36 To find a replacement, Buffett 
turned to his newly-hired management assistant, twenty-
eight-year-old Tracy Britt Cool. The recently-minted 
Harvard MBA suggested Robert Merritt, who was installed. 
But not two years later, Merritt succumbed to the same fate. 
Surrounding both episodes was an atmosphere of crisis, with 
distributors and other constituents complaining about the 
degradation of the company amid wonder about how such a 
great company could have taken such a deep plunge. 
The Benjamin Moore departures reveal two variations on 
the costs of the Berkshire model as it relates to executive 
oversight.37 The first concerns how executives are chosen at 
Berkshire, which is through internal and informal means 
rather than the conventional route of using an external 
executive search firm. The second cost of the Benjamin 
Moore shuffles concerns the wisdom of Buffett’s commitment 




35 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 66–
67. 
36 James Covert, Warren Buffett Fired Benjamin Moore CEO after 
Bermuda Cruise, N.Y. POST (June 15, 2012), http://nypost.com/2012/06/15/ 
warren-buffett-fired-benjamin-moore-ceo-after-bermuda-cruise [http:// 
perma.cc/D2BB-T4EY]. 
37 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, NetJets Shuffle: Costs of Deviations 
from the Berkshire Model, VALUE WALK (June 1, 2015), http://www. 
valuewalk.com/2015/06/netjets-ceo-buffett [http://perma.cc/MCK7-4DFW]. 
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in the first place.38 Two successive CEOs reflected an 
intuition about the difficulty of exclusively selling paint that 
way given contemporary distribution channels. Yet they 
were handcuffed by a commitment made solely by Buffett, 
which might have been different if vetted through the 
Berkshire board or a committee, an industry consultant, or 
at least a group of executives with direct merchandising 
experience—all of which is alien to the Berkshire model. 
The costs of managerial succession crisis could be 
mitigated by modest expansion of corporate bureaucracy 
(like asking a board committee’s opinion on executive 
personnel decisions) or slight diminution of the trust-based 
culture (such as conducting background checks or adding 
periodic reviews and evaluations). In connection with 
Berkshire’s annual meeting in the past few years, I have 
observed Berkshire moving in this direction—for example, 
regular annual meetings of the subsidiary CEOs or 
sometimes joining the board without Buffett’s presence. 
Buffett’s successor will likely organize Berkshire into some 
dozen divisions whose heads report to headquarters—the 
model followed at the Marmon Group, a mini-Berkshire 
created by the fabled Pritzker brothers and now a Berkshire 
subsidiary.39 
C. Externalities of Decentralization: 
Consumers/Workers 
Buffett delegates nearly unbridled discretion to 
subsidiary chief executives; many of those likewise delegate 
power to heads of divisions, and many Berkshire companies 
 
38 See Steve Jordon, Warren Buffett Says He Replaced Benjamin 
Moore’s CEO to Keep a Promise, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://www.omaha.com/money/warren-buffett-says-he-replaced-benjamin-
moore-s-ceo-to/article_1c0cb4b7-b2bc-514e-a6a3-ae9697c2ee6f.html [http:// 
perma.cc/HMY8-UU6K]; James Covert, Warren Buffett Cans Benjamin 
Moore CEO, N.Y. POST (Sept. 27, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/09/27/ 
warren-buffett-cans-benjamin-moore-ceo [http://perma.cc/89UJ-EJXZ]. 
39 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 
167–73. 
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are premised on decentralization.40 The vast majority 
discharge duties faithfully and without public incident, in 
accordance with tenets of Berkshire culture, including 
integrity. But there are exceptions or awkward 
circumstances that result in mistreatment of consumers and 
workers. 
A chief concern of any decentralized business model is 
policing personnel, such as when distributors mistreat 
dealers41 or when dealers use illegal high-pressured sales 
tactics. At Berkshire’s Scott Fetzer subsidiary, distributors of 
Kirby vacuums are autonomous businesses.42 But they also 
represent the brand and company. In the past, some violated 
company policy on proper marketing and employment 
practices or even broke consumer protection and fair labor 
laws.43 Private lawsuits and state enforcement actions 
resulted.44 In addition to naming the individual businesses 
as defendants, these claims often also allege that Scott 
Fetzer and, therefore by extension, Berkshire are culpable.45 
Such criticisms appear to have been more common in the 
1990s, but they persisted.46 
Yet avoiding the costs of legal entanglements and liability 
would require withdrawing distributor autonomy. The 
company would have to change its entire business model to 
subject all to comprehensive training, supervision, and 
remediation. Such an approach imposes direct 
 
40 Id. 
41 See Lee Howard, Ex-Kirby Employees Can Join Suit, DAY (New 
London, CT) (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/20120328/ 
BIZ02/303289972 [http://perma.cc/2D2G-4B7T]. 
42 See Joseph P. Cahill, How Kirby Persuades Consumers to Shell Out 
$1,500 for Vacuum, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 1999), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB938991433813279910 [http://perma.cc/V7RR-3M46]. 
43 See id.; Greg Dawson, Kirby Always Cleaning Up After Others, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 27, 2004), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/ 
2004-08-27/news/0408261168_1_kirby-distributors-steve-griffith 
[http://perma.cc/P5G3-3YVM]. 
44 See Jordan v. Scott Fetzer Co., No. 4:07-CV-80 (CDL), 2009 WL 
1885063, at *1 (M.D. Ga. June 30, 2009); Howard, supra note 41. 
45 See Jordan, 2009 WL 1885063, at *1. 
46 See Dawson, supra note 43. 
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administrative costs as well as unobservable costs to 
entrepreneurship and the spirit of ownership that autonomy 
showers on self-starters. On balance, the distributorship 
system’s autonomy value has appeared to outweigh such 
costs. 
Berkshire’s decentralized structure becomes costlier when 
combined with its minimalist approach to internal controls. 
A dramatic example was exposed on the floor of the 2009 
Berkshire annual meeting by a former employee of a textile 
manufacturing operation in Honduras. In the early 2000s, 
before Berkshire’s Fruit of the Loom acquired it, Russell 
Corporation agreed to produce sportswear adorned with 
popular logos, including for college and professional 
basketball teams.47 But the goods were made in factories 
located in China and Honduras that engaged in objectionable 
conduct. In China, products were manufactured in 
sweatshops that violated international human rights; in 
Honduras, company officials boarded up the plant and 
ousted workers in retaliation for unionization efforts.48 
Such misbehavior drew the attention of activists across 
the United States, including a group of college students who 
demanded that universities terminate the agreements.49 It 
was not until after the 2009 meeting, however, that Buffett 
and Fruit’s CEO found out about the problem and Fruit 
corrected the problems.50 Information must reach Berkshire 
headquarters quickly concerning potential subsidiary 
violations of company policy or law. But the Berkshire model 
is informal, based heavily on one of the few mandates on 
subsidiary managers: to report bad news early. Whatever 
gains arise from such an approach—a trust-based culture 
based on integrity—some violations occur and escape 
scrutiny, which are clearly a cost of the Berkshire model.51 
 
47 CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 214. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 214–15. 
51 In October 2014, an employee benefits committee of Berkshire’s 
Acme Brick subsidiary, which includes Acme CFO Judy Hunter, alleged 
that a 2010 cutback in the company match under Acme’s 401(k) plan 
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More general criticisms against Berkshire concerning 
employee relations arose from the partnership deals it has 
made with 3G, the Brazilian private equity firm famous for 
downsizing acquisition targets. In 2013, Berkshire and 3G 
jointly acquired H.J. Heinz Company—which, two years 
later, merged with Kraft.52 In each case, 3G took charge of 
operations and proceeded to make major changes, replacing 
top managers and cutting jobs.53 Heinz had conditioned its 
sale to Berkshire and 3G on their promise to maintain the 
company’s presence and heritage in Pittsburgh, Heinz’s 
home since its 1869 founding, but no commitment was made 
about employees or other constituents (a contrast to Buffett’s 
 
breached Berkshire’s promises, made in its 2000 acquisition agreement, to 
make no changes in the plan. Complaint at 29–30, Hunter v. Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00663, 2015 WL 5920283 (N.D. Tex., Aug. 5, 
2015). The committee also alleged violations of pension law and said 
Berkshire used “strong-arm tactics against Acme’s management” to freeze 
accrual of pension benefits. Id. at 1. The benefits committee objected, 
requesting that Acme’s board (which includes Marc Hamburg, Berkshire 
CFO) restore the match retroactively, along with related earnings. When 
Berkshire responded by offering to either restore the match but freeze the 
pension or maintain the match and defer the pension freeze, the 
committee called this an “ultimatum” and “strong-arm tactic.” Id. at 1, 17. 
The Acme benefits dispute may simply be an internal parent-subsidiary 
disagreement, pitting Berkshire CFO Hamburg against Acme CFO 
Hunter. That would be a likely explanation under Berkshire’s principle of 
autonomy, with Buffett letting Hamburg and Hunter duke it out. On the 
other hand, Buffett takes a special interest in post-retirement benefit plan 
changes—the subject is one of only six points Buffett requests specific 
updates on from CEO subsidiaries, an exception to the usual principle of 
autonomy. 
52 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, H.J. Heinz Company Enters 
Into Agreement to Be Acquired by Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital 
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/feb1413.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6DWE-BNM6]; Press Release, H.J. Heinz, H.J. Heinz 
Company and Kraft Foods Group Sign Definitive Merger Agreement to 
Form The Kraft Heinz Company (Mar. 25, 2015), http://news.heinz.com/ 
press-release/finance/hj-heinz-company-and-kraft-foods-group-sign-
definitive-merger-agreement-form-k [http://perma.cc/73QR-MFQW]. 
53 See Annie Gasparro, Three More Longtime Executives Leaving 
Heinz, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424052702304049704579318663756827846 [http://perma.cc/4YTQ-X3SJ]. 
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commitment to distributors when acquiring Benjamin 
Moore).54 
Critics of private equity and fans of Berkshire found the 
partnership incongruous, and raised the criticism at 
Berkshire’s annual meetings. Buffett said “I tip my hat to 
what the 3G people have done,” noting that there were 
“considerably more people in the job than needed” at the 
companies 3G bought.55 He added: “I hope our Berkshire 
companies are not being run with more people than they 
need, either.”56 Buffett did not directly address the contrast 
between Berkshire’s own style and that of 3G or private 
equity generally, leaving many dissatisfied and sustaining 
rather than quelling perceived hypocrisy.57 After all, 
Berkshire never buys a company knowing of a high 
headcount ready to be reduced. 
 
54 See Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, supra note 52; see also 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
55 Stephen Foley, Warren Buffett Forced to Defend Relationship with 




57 For additional discussion of accusations of hypocrisy as a Berkshire 
blemish, see infra text accompanying notes 100–12. In the case of co-
investing with 3G, another rationale might have explained the difference 
between Berkshire’s own companies and those in which it co-invests, 
whether with 3G or in the open stock market. Berkshire companies define 
Berkshire culture and related actions are taken entirely in the Berkshire 
name. The 3G companies are investments, though large ones, with 3G in 
charge and related actions taken in its name. If 3G’s downsizing hurt 
those companies, Berkshire could withdraw from the investment; if they 
help, Berkshire can continue or even acquire full ownership from 3G. 
  But besides not being how Buffett explained it, there are costs to such 
a partnership approach. For one, it relies on a distinction between 
abstaining from making layoffs directly and financing them for indirect 
profit. Foley, supra note 55 (“If 3G destroys rather than improves 
Heinz/Kraft, then Berkshire can sell, without violating any principle, but 
if 3G improves the investee to Berkshire standards, it can acquire the 
whole. . . . 3G does the work of both getting the deal and making the 
changes, while Berkshire has an option on the upside, both economic and 
cultural.”). 
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Berkshire also faces criticism for participating in the 
purchase of Kraft, famous as a purveyor of processed and 
unhealthy foods. Critics likewise question Berkshire 
investments in other unhealthy consumer products, 
including candies, carbonated soda, and ice cream.58 On the 
other hand, Buffett and Munger have passed on economically 
valuable opportunities when bothered by a consumer 
product, such as tobacco companies.59 But if socially 
responsible investing were a top priority for Berkshire, then 
a diverse and informed investment committee would be in 
charge of decisions rather than a single capital allocator.  
D. Reputation Risks of Skimping on Public Relations 
Berkshire is unusual in corporate America for not having 
a substantial professional communications staff or platoon of 
lobbyists.60 For years, Buffett has boasted about this form of 
thrift, emphasizing that he writes his own letters and taking 
pride in presiding over Berkshire’s annual shareholders’ 
meeting where he and Munger respond to questions for six 
hours.61 Nor does Berkshire host analyst conference calls or 
participate in the process of generating earnings guidance. 
Buffett promises the subsidiaries freedom from such 
pressure too, whether it is the analysts inquiring about 
earnings or the press probing corporate affairs. 
 
58 See Tracer, supra note 1; Stock, supra note 1. For that matter, 
advocates of a host of causes could challenge innumerable Berkshire 
interests, ranging from environmentalists against coal-fired power plants 
to human rights advocates boycotting Israeli companies for the country’s 
treatment of Palestinians. 
59 This assertion is based on private correspondence in the author’s 
files, which have been verified by editors of the Columbia Business Law 
Review. 
60 An entire academic and professional field is devoted to the topic. 
See, e.g., JOEP CORNELISSEN, CORPORATE COMMUNICATION: A GUIDE TO 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2011); PAUL A. ARGENTI, CORPORATE 
COMMUNICATION (6th ed. 2012). 
61 See, e.g., THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 34–35 
(owner-related business principle number 12), 80. 
CUNNINGHAM – FINAL  
24 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
Yet the subsidiaries engage in competitive markets with 
pressures from rivals, media, and political foes. Berkshire’s 
most important business historically has been insurance, an 
industry central to the functioning of the American economy, 
and Berkshire’s most substantial investments have been in 
the financial sector.62 Among other Berkshire subsidiaries, 
Clayton Homes is a significant supplier of low-income 
housing while Berkshire Hathaway Energy is a force in its 
industry with an influential voice in the evolution of related 
national policy. While certain Berkshire subsidiaries 
maintain public relations specialists or lobbyists, most do not 
and there is no centralized function for such services. 
Whether merely a product of image envy in high profile 
businesses or something more substantive, the costs of 
corporate exposés can be mitigated by greater coordination 
and formalization of the public relations function. 
One such exposé attacked Berkshire’s practice of 
generating substantial investable funds from insurance 
float.63 Insurance float refers to funds that arise from the 
fact that policy premiums are paid up front while claims 
need only be paid, if at all, much later. Buffett frequently 
describes the appeal of such leverage, explaining that 
Berkshire is often paid to hold such money—so long as risks 
are properly priced.64 Buffett thus stresses the relative cost 
of float, noting the importance of disciplined underwriting. 
But a reporter turned the strategy around on Berkshire, 
portraying the company’s approach as giving insurance 
personnel perverse incentives to do everything in their power 
to avoid or delay paying legitimate claims, including acting 
in bad faith. 
 
62 See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
63 Mark Greenblatt, Berkshire Hathaway Subsidiaries Deny, Delay 




64 See, e.g., THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 32, 
295, 299, 302. 
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The focus of the October 2013 exposé, by Mark Greenblatt 
of Scripps, was National Indemnity Company’s (“NICO”) 
specialty business in retroactively reinsuring long-tail 
asbestos and environmental risks, giving a dozen 
illustrations from the thousands of policies it wrote.65 The 
illustrations involved legal disputes among policyholders, 
corporate defendants, the original insurer, and Berkshire’s 
companies. The piece spotlighted lawsuits charging bad faith 
in payment delays or denials, including lawsuits by 
policyholders against the ceding insurers under the original 
insurance policies or against NICO alleging wrongful 
interference with those policies.66 The story quoted 
aspersions from claimants, their lawyers, and insurance 
industry executives, blaming Berkshire’s float philosophy for 
the problems.67 
While Greenblatt had reached out to Berkshire and NICO 
personnel for comment, the recipients did not grant 
interviews and time constraints made them unable to 
respond to every written question he posed.68 Within days of 
publication, Berkshire emailed Greenblatt to explain various 
 
65 Greenblatt, supra note 63. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. Greenblatt interviewed me for the story too, and correctly 
quoted me as countering as follows:  
George Washington University law professor Lawrence 
Cunningham cautions that float is an “inherent feature” of 
insurance, and it’s not unusual to see lawsuits in which 
policyholders or claimants say an insurer or claims 
administrator acted in bad faith by delaying payment. 
Cunningham, who is also a Berkshire shareholder and has 
edited several editions of “The Essays of Warren Buffett,” 
said Berkshire corporate culture rests on “unwavering 
commitment to integrity.” He said it would be “antithetical 
for the company to jeopardize that reputation by 
wrongfully delaying or denying claims or acting in any way 
inconsistent with faithful administration and payment of 
claims.” 
68 Interested readers can find the email queries at the following link:  
http://media2.scrippsnationalnews.com/shns/Risky_Business/Berkshire_e
mails/index.html [http://perma.cc/74DR-U2JQ]. 
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inaccuracies in the story but, shortly thereafter, Scripps 
emailed Berkshire to say it stood by it.69 So two weeks later, 
Berkshire publicized a rebuttal, asserting “bias and lack of 
professionalism” in the report.70 Examples: the piece wrongly 
suggested Berkshire controlled the defense of an asbestos 
case when the corporate defendant did, incorrectly 
insinuated that Berkshire unreasonably resists settling 
cases by focusing on 100% of the amount a plaintiff sought 
rather than Berkshire’s fractional share among multiple 
defendants, and credited critical comments of an insurance 
claims executive without appreciating potential bias from his 
involvement in disputes with Berkshire.71 
Despite Berkshire’s refutation, such allegations reach the 
public and resonate with it. It is one way corporate 
reputations are shaped. And the story continued to have 
legs. In January 2014, a lawyer from K&L Gates collated the 
cases in a presentation to the American Bar Association.72 It 
is not obvious that Berkshire would have done better with a 
more traditional public relations department. After all, other 
 




71 Id. Berkshire stressed that its payments in this business for claims 
and claims-expenses exceeded $2.4 billion annually and $20 billion 
cumulatively. The press release references Berkshire’s honoring its multi-
pronged duties to policyholders, insurers and reinsurers for which it 
manages claims, regulators, and shareholders “who expect us to operate 
well above any minimum standards of practice for our business.” 
Berkshire also noted winning respect from all such constituencies, and 
awards from peers and industry trade groups. Acknowledging that the 
run-off and legacy areas involve complex contested claims, Berkshire said 
these could not be reduced to sound bites though the piece had tried to do 
just that. Berkshire stressed that though it disfavors public comments on 
pending cases, it felt constrained to do so to defend against a report that 
seemed calculated to influence those cases. 
72 John Sylvester, Policyholder Litigation Involving Claims Handling 
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insurers such as AIG have also been accused of slow-pay and 
no-pay practices.73 
But the interaction between Greenblatt and the company 
was partial, as the Berkshire executives reached by 
Greenblatt regarded their insurance business duties as more 
important than complete engagement with the reporter. A 
full-time professional who makes such engagement a top 
priority would have formulated a comprehensive assessment 
ahead of publication, contributing to shaping the original 
story. That preparation would have likely led to a better 
outcome for Berkshire than the thrust and parry that now 
defines the public record. Berkshire acts as if it is small, but 
it is a Goliath to reporters and readers alike. 
Berkshire and several of its subsidiaries often also make 
for good political targets, as evidenced by a campaign 
launched against Clayton Homes on April 3, 2015 by Daniel 
Wagner and Mike Baker.74 Writing a piece sponsored by the 
Center for Public Integrity in The Seattle Times, they alleged 
that Clayton’s sales team channeled buyers into dubious 
mortgages: customers were offered few or no alternative 
financing options, terms were seductive (including low down-
payment requirements), defaults and foreclosures were high, 
and collection practices were aggressive, the authors 
asserted.75 
 
73 See, e.g., Dean Starkman, AIG’s Other Reputation: Some Customers 
Say the Insurance Giant Is Too Reluctant to Pay Up, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/20/ 
AR2005082000179.html [http://perma.cc/V4AF-W36K]. 
74 Daniel Wagner & Mike Baker, Warren Buffett’s Mobile Home 
Empire Preys on the Poor, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 6, 2015, 8:57 
PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/03/17024/warren-buffetts-
mobile-home-empire-preys-poor [http://perma.cc/4FHN-CXFS]. 
75 Id. The piece called out its own key findings about Clayton Homes: 
using multiple corporate names to make buyers believe they are shopping 
around; lending at rates exceeding fifteen percent and adding significant 
fees; customers complaining of deception and predation via changes, 
pressure, and fees; and two former dealers saying headquarters pressured 
them into channeling customers to borrow from Clayton despite these 
problems. 
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Clayton promptly issued a response disagreeing with 
every negative assertion in the piece.76 It stressed its policies 
of customer protection while acknowledging that, in a 
minority of cases such as the ones the writers portrayed, 
customers facing periodic life challenges have difficulty 
repaying loans and may face foreclosure.77 The authors 
responded with a point-by-point rebuttal.78 At the Berkshire 
annual shareholders’ meeting five weeks later, Buffett also 
repudiated the piece and, again, one of the writers responded 
with continued skepticism.79 
The real reasons behind the piece later emerged to be 
more political than first appeared. At the time of the report, 
Congress had begun debating regulations applicable to 
manufactured housing loans.80 After the financial crisis of 
2008, the Dodd-Frank Act added disclosure and timing 
requirements to such loans bearing high interest rates, 
 
76 Clayton Homes Statement on Mobile-Home Buyer Investigation, 





78 Daniel Wagner & Mike Baker, A Look at Berkshire Hathaway’s 
Response to ‘Mobile Home Trap’ Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(Apr. 7, 2015, 9:12 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/06/17081/ 
look-berkshire-hathaways-response-mobile-home-trap-investigation 
[http://perma.cc/Y72J-VUYX]. 
79 Mike Baker, Buffett Sticks Up For Mobile-Home Business at 
Shareholder Meeting, SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www. 
seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/buffett-sticks-up-for-mobile-home-
business-at-shareholder-meeting/ [http://perma.cc/7Q3A-4CGY]. All the 
claims contradict everything Clayton Homes stands for, as I explained in 
both my book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett, and in a New York Times column 
several months before this piece—a column, incidentally, which Clayton 
Homes cited in its response and which the writers dismissed in rebuttal 
because it was written by me, whom they called “a longtime Buffett 
acolyte.” Wagner & Baker, supra note 78; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Philosophy of Warren E. Buffett, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 1, 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/business/dealbook/the-philosophy-of-
warren-e-buffett.html [http://perma.cc/CXT4-7S79]. 
80 See Preserving Access to Manufactured Housing Act of 2015, H.R. 
650, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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which Congress has been considering repealing as onerous 
and costly—a House vote was set for mid-April.81 Clayton 
and other industry leaders supported repeal while some 
homeowner and consumer groups were opposed. On one side, 
the manufactured housing trade association stressed the 
importance of unregulated access for lower income people to 
this kind of housing, while consumer advocates urged 
regulation to protect the impecunious from costly housing 
loans.82 
Although the original report did not mention these points, 
the writers added the theme in a story in mid-May—linking 
their original assertions to Clayton’s incentives in the 
political debate and making it clear that they were on the 
other side of that debate.83 Thus, it appears that the authors 
wrote a piece of political advocacy, not investigative 
journalism, and targeted Clayton based on ulterior motives, 
not as neutral reporters of facts. Notably, it was also 
revealed that one of the writers, Wagner, had an undisclosed 
conflict of interest: his sister was a lawyer representing 
plaintiffs in lawsuits against Clayton Homes.84 
If Clayton’s formal response and Buffett’s oral comments 
had missed their mark, consideration should certainly be 
given to changing Berkshire’s lean anti-bureaucratic model 
to add a department of political or public affairs at the 
 
81 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 114-53, at 2–3 (2015). 
82 Compare Jan Hollingsworth, Dodd-Frank and Manufactured Home 
Financing: The Place Where Good Intentions and Unintended 
Consequences Collide, MANUFACTURED HOME LIVING NEWS (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/18/idUSnGNX5smRmG+1c5+GNW
20150518 [http://perma.cc/SGW3-PWMK], with Zach Carter, House 
Republicans Hand Warren Buffett Big Win on Expensive Loans to the Poor, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/ 
04/14/manufactured-housing-republicans_n_7065810.html [http://perma. 
cc/VEW5-P8MR]. 
83 Mike Baker, Buffett’s Mobile-Home Business Has Most to Gain 
From Deregulation Plan, SEATTLE TIMES (May 17, 2015), http://www. 
seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/buffetts-mobile-home-business-has-
most-to-gain-from-deregulation-plan [http://perma.cc/GQ3Y-R743]. 
84 Baker, supra note 79.  
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subsidiary and/or parent levels.85 As with Greenblatt’s NICO 
story, the reporters said they repeatedly tried to connect 
with Berkshire and Clayton personnel without success86—
undoubtedly in part due to how Berkshire has no public 
relations personnel. Also, as with the NICO story, it may be 
more prudent for a company of Berkshire’s scale and impact 
to maintain a dedicated professional to handle such 
investigative reporting, as distasteful as that may be to 
Buffett and others at Berkshire.87 
Some Berkshire subsidiaries maintain their own coterie 
of public relations and lobbying professionals. Visit the web 
page of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, for example, and you 
will read of its involvement at the center of important 
national policy debates ranging from consumer energy prices 
to climate change.88 One proxy for the centrality of Berkshire 
to national energy policy is the series of shareholder 
proposals in recent years seeking to have Berkshire’s board 
 
85 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 18. 
86 Wagner & Baker, supra note 78. 
87 In Clayton’s case, Wagner and Baker continued their campaign, 
publishing an incendiary piece the day after Christmas 2015 charging that 
Clayton’s corporate culture is rabidly racist. See Mike Baker & Dan 
Wagner, Minorities Exploited by Warren Buffett’s Mobile Home Empire, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/times-watchdog/minorities-exploited-by-warren-buffetts-mobile-
home-empire-clayton-homes [http://perma.cc/7YZ2-5MMU]. Clayton 
promptly responded with a corporate press release repudiating all 
allegations. See Press Release, Clayton Homes, Reporting 
Mischaracterizes Clayton Homes’ Treatment of Customers and Employees 
(Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151226005 
004/en/Reporting-Mischaracterizes-Clayton-Homes%E2%80%99-Treatme 
nt-Customers-Employees [http://perma.cc/NX8Z-PEPY]. Several 
Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Financial Services called for a federal investigation. See Letter from Rep. 
Maxine Waters et al. to Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, and Hon. Loretta Lynch, Attorney General (Jan. 12, 
2016), http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/01.12. 
2016_manufactured_housing_letter_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/B5PJ-2JCC]. 
88 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ENERGY, https://www.berkshirehathaway 
energyco.com [http://perma.cc/9SCC-ALZ6]. 
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set air quality goals for its utility businesses—such proposals 
were made in 2011, 2013, and 2014.89 
Berkshire Hathaway Energy has grown to its present 
continental scale through acquisition, both before and since 
Berkshire’s purchase of it, with each unit maintaining such 
departments, along with professionals who regularly engage 
in price-setting processes with local public utility 
authorities.90 The company and its subsidiaries engage in 
public debates and policy determinations in matters ranging 
from the construction of specific new coal-fired power plants 
to the national transition from fossil fuels to solar. 
In such settings, the need for professional public relations 
and lobbying personnel is clear, as suggested by solar power 
debates in Nevada affecting Berkshire’s local public utility, 
NV Energy. At issue is how much credit residential solar 
users get for electricity they generate for transmission back 
to the power grid. State law provided for aggregate credits 
up to three percent of the utility’s historical peak load for 
such “net metering” credit. So long as state-wide solar 
generation was less than that, all solar users earned full 
credit; if the limit were exceeded, new solar users would not 
get the credit. Solar advocates sought to boost the cap, 
arguing it would soon be reached and stressing the need for 
economic incentives to sustain solarization; NV Energy 
resisted, forecasting reaching the cap much later and noting 
the need to avoid having those without solar panels pay more 
for energy than those with solar panels.91 
 
89 Steve Jordon, Warren Watch: Buffett’s ‘German Scout’ On the Hunt, 
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Mar. 22, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/ 
money/warren-watch-buffett-s-german-scout-on-the-hunt/article_92a927 
bd-1a7f-5436-9cec-f02372c24fd6.html [http://perma.cc/GF4D-VAG9]. 
90 See Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
46, 70–75 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.berkshirehathawayenergyco.com/ 
assets/upload/financial-filing/20141231_99_bhe_annual.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/VSL8-VG2S] (discussing general corporate as well as unit-buy-unit 
regulatory matters). 
91 Net Metering, NV ENERGY, https://www.nvenergy.com/renewables 
environment/renewablegenerations/NetMetering.cfm [http://perma.cc/QB 
T8-E97Y] (showing that NV Energy offered different rates to customers 
depending on time of use). See, e.g., Jim Wrathall, Nevada Solar Update: 
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Both sides lobbied and engaged in public relations 
campaigns—and both were accused of overdoing it. At a 
public hearing on the issue, for example, lawmakers accused 
the solar industry of sending “aggressive” emails criticizing 
specific people, prompting a leading solar advocate to 
apologize publicly for his staff’s work.92 The accusations 
against NV Energy went beyond that company to target 
Berkshire itself, especially Buffett, turning the local story 
into a David versus Goliath match shaded by assertions of 
overzealous capitalism, greed, and hypocrisy. One headline 
read that “Warren Buffett is sending mixed messages on 
green energy.”93 Contrasting Buffett’s boasts of Berkshire 
investments in renewables with NV’s position in the Nevada 
debate, one source cynically declared, “[i]t always comes 
down to money . . . even if it looks kind of hypocritical.”94 
While editors may have liked the storyline pitting 
consumer-loving, tree-hugging do-gooders against the 
monopolistic profiteers at Berkshire, in fact, the duller 
reality was the complex and contestable public policy of 
 
Senator Harry Reid Takes On Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway in Net 
Metering Debate, SULLIVAN & WORCESTER: ENERGY FIN. REPORT (Sept. 8, 
2015, 8:00 AM), http://blog.sandw.com/energyfinancereport/2015/09/ 
nevada-solar-update-senator-harry-reid-takes-on-warren-buffets-berkshire 
-hathaway-in-net-metering-debate [http://perma.cc/EF5J-8BK8]; Herman 
K. Trabish, As Regulators Act, Nevada Net Metering Debate Takes Center 
Stage at Las Vegas Conference, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www. 
utilitydive.com/news/as-regulators-act-nevada-net-metering-debate-takes-
center-stage-at-las-veg/404799 [http://perma.cc/V4ZF-3WUP]; Krysti 
Shallenberger, Heated Debate in Nev. Over Solar Net Metering Settles 
Down, GOVERNORS’ WIND ENERGY COAL. (May 26, 2015), http://www.gov 
ernorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=13146 [https://perma.cc/M2LL-EW8D]. 
92 Reem Nasr, Ground Zero in the Solar Wars: Nevada, CNBC (May 
26, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/26/ground-zero-in-the-
solar-wars-nevada.html [http://perma.cc/HCT5-C2VC]. 
93 Mark Chediak, Noah Buhayar, & Margaret Newkirk, Warren 
Buffett Is Sending Mixed Messages on Green Energy, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
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transitioning from fossil fuels to renewables.95 Berkshire has 
a dog in that fight and NV Energy is one of the many 
Berkshire Hathaway Energy subsidiaries actively engaged in 
the process. It would be absurd to believe, however, that 
energy scientists and business executives alone will define 
the dialogue and process everything that the energy 
company requires be said. For that, the company must have 
public relations specialists and lobbying professionals on 
staff. 
More generally, while Berkshire has won plaudits for 
good corporate citizenship,96 some complain about the 
absence of conglomerate-wide reporting on social 
responsibility or sustainability.97 Berkshire’s unusual 
structure does not lend itself to issuing a formal corporate 
report at the Berkshire level and most of the subsidiaries are 
essentially semi-private: given the parent’s gargantuan size, 
all but a few subsidiaries are so small in relation to it that 
only limited disclosure is included about them in Berkshire’s 
public filings.98 While all can indeed fend for themselves and 
 
95 Reem Nasr of CNBC quoted me correctly as follows: “The question 
is how fast we should move as a society in transition from fossil fuels to 
renewables, because there will be a transition eventually. . . . Berkshire 
[executives] are capitalists who are interested in returns. . . . But at the 
same time, [Buffett] has scruples and the company has a conscience.” 
Nasr, supra note 92. 
96 E.g., BOS. COLL. CARROLL SCH. OF MGMT., THE MOST RESPECTED U.S. 
COMPANIES (2008), http://www.bcccc.net/_uploads/documents/live/Global 
Pulse2008.pdf?__hstc=166758561.28c25f3522ded499ee82095cf3ff99bd.144
7538430494.1447971346846.1448059856934.3&__hssc=166758561.1.1448
059856934&__hsfp=607606643 [http://perma.cc/9KQR-E9AC] (ranking 
Berkshire ninth out of 203 companies analyzed based on survey data of 
20,000 people). 
97 Elaine Cohen, Warren Buffett on Sustainability. Not., CSR-
REPORTING (June 12, 2010), http://csr-reporting.blogspot.com/2010/06/ 
warren-buffett-on-sustainability-not.html [http://perma.cc/6A8X-YKNZ]. 
98 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 125 (2015) 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2014ar/2014ar.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8 
EA-R6Z6] (showing total number of Berkshire employees as 340,499). Two 
large Berkshire subsidiaries, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF, 
have public debt outstanding and therefore file regular periodic reports 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission containing considerable 
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there is some cost to having a centralized public relations 
function, creating an effective office need not be a splurge. 
It would be simple enough to hire a single professional to 
oversee all the subsidiaries and to guard Berkshire’s 
reputation from Omaha as needed. The cost would be modest 
and there would be scant imposition on subsidiary 
autonomy. On a related note, Berkshire likewise has no 
general counsel’s office, and while that has generally not 
been a problem, it has occasionally failed to make legally 
required filings.99 While apparently not material, such lapses 
show poor corporate housekeeping. Such practices are not 
ones that any company should want and impose costs on the 
business. Correcting it would be relatively simple: hire a 
general counsel. 
E. Hypocrisy Charges and Uncertainty Due to Alter 
Ego 
Buffett kept a relatively low profile through most of his 
career. He became a celebrity only in the early 2000s. 
Although as Berkshire’s public face he previously took 
positions on corporate topics—accounting, governance, and 
takeovers—at that point, he began to address general 
matters of national interest, including the hot button issues 
of taxes and wealth. But those topics tended to entwine 
Buffett’s private life with Berkshire’s future—especially its 
ownership structure—so they were uniquely suited for him 
to address. It presented a downside, however. 
 
detail. Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 2, 
2015) https://www.berkshirehathawayenergyco.com/assets/upload/finan 
cial-filing/20141231_99_bhe_annual.pdf [http://perma.cc/MR2P-M84V]; 
BNSF Railway, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www. 
bnsf.com/about-bnsf/financial-information/form-10-k-filings/pdf/10k-llc-
2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/UHE3-KADU]. 
99 David McLaughlin, Warren Buffett Agrees to Settlement After 
Violating Antitrust Laws, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/warren-buffett-agrees-to-settlement-
after-violating-antitrust-laws [http://perma.cc/S8LN-Y5MT]. Berkshire 
generally retains Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP for legal work, which tends 
to involve corporate acquisitions and securities disclosure. 
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People conflated Buffett’s views on estate taxes, which he 
supported, with Berkshire’s interest in acquiring family 
companies at discounts when owners faced such tax 
liabilities. That is especially costly considering how 
Berkshire itself is a microcosm of America—some of its 
subsidiaries were founded and run by deeply conservative 
families in Salt Lake City and Waco, others by progressives 
in Boston and Seattle. The company’s businesses are 
managed by devout Christians, observant Jews, and 
practicing Mormons, as well as agnostics and atheists, 
Americans, Germans, and Israelis, totaling nearly 350,000 
employees worldwide.100 
Buffett’s condemnation of the financial services industry 
has provoked both ire and charges of hypocrisy. One-third of 
Berkshire’s $130 billion investment portfolio is concentrated 
in financial intermediaries, including longstanding 
substantial positions in American Express and Wells Fargo, 
plus stakes in controversial institutions at the center of the 
2008 financial crisis like Bank of America and Moody’s.101 
Yet Buffett lambasts banks and other financial 
intermediaries for both high fees and poor services.102 
Similarly, as noted earlier, Buffett is a critic of private 
equity companies, yet partnered twice in recent years with 
private equity firm 3G in substantial acquisitions.103 The 
perceived wedge between word and deed and related 
criticism is longstanding. In the 1980s, Buffett chastised 
 
100 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Big-Hearted Warren Buffett’s Guide to 
Giving, CNBC (Dec. 5, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/05/ 
where-big-hearted-buffett-and-his-best-friend-disagree.html [http://perma. 
cc/777G-ZBPF]. 
101 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2015) 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2014ar/2014ar.pdf [http://perma.cc/W4 
L5-2CMM] (among total portfolio value of $117 billion, listing American 
Express, Goldman Sachs, Moody’s, U.S. Bancorp, and Wells Fargo, 
aggregating to $50 billion). 
102 THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, 169–74; see 
Anupreeta Das, Warren Buffett Has an Image Problem, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
12, 2015, 6:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/warren-buffett-has-an-
image-problem-1447371811 [http://perma.cc/MXH2-EQNQ]. 
103 See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
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leveraged buyout operators, corporate raiders, and the 
bankers who charged vast fees to aid them; yet Berkshire 
owned a large stake in Salomon Brothers, which earned 
substantial profits by arranging debt financing and 
facilitating hostile takeovers.104 It is possible to square these 
positions—chosen companies are exceptions, distinguishing 
relative fees from blanket reproach, or contrast Buffett’s 
personal views from Berkshire’s corporate practices. But the 
disconnect remains a cost, one derived from the executive 
choice of public statements. 
Buffett’s and Berkshire’s approaches to taxes present a 
similar disconnect that has posed related costs. For example, 
Buffett has said and written about the unfairness of the 
American tax code, famously saying his secretary pays more 
taxes than he does.105 Yet Berkshire defers taxes through 
lengthy holding periods, finds innumerable ways to minimize 
taxes and maximize tax credits, and pursues tax-advantaged 
transactions. Howls of hypocrisy result which, of course, 
confuse Buffett the individual with Berkshire the company106 
as well as miss the difference between pure tax strategies 
and the broader investment values Berkshire has long 
adopted.107 
Among tax-advantaged deals that could equally be 
explained by Berkshire’s fundamental investment 
philosophy was its 2014 swap of long-time holdings in The 
 
104 See Dale Arthur Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of 
the ‘80s Through the Letters of Warren Buffett: Current Acquisition 
Practice is Clogged by Legal Flotsam from the Decade, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
565, 573–77 (1997). 
105 See Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-
the-super-rich.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2JVS-XSFQ]; Morris Propp, 
Warren Buffett’s Nifty Tax Loophole, BARRON’S (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/warren-buffetts-nifty-tax-loophole-
1428726092# [http://perma.cc/9ZLH-YRA8]. 
106 Propp, supra note 105; Tim Worstall, Warren Buffett’s Very 
Strange Tax Argument, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2011/08/15/warren-buffetts-very-strange-tax-argument 
[http://perma.cc/Z2W4-B9R2]. 
107 See THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 282–85. 
CUNNINGHAM – FINAL  
No. 1:1] BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES 37 
Washington Post Company (by then called Graham Holdings 
Company) for a television station; an outright sale of the 
stock would have triggered capital gains of some $400 
million.108 Or consider Berkshire’s swap in 2015 of long-time 
holdings in Gillette (dating to the 1980s and eventually part 
of Procter & Gamble) in exchange for the Duracell battery 
business, which included nearly $2 billion in cash, yet was 
tax-deferred. Selling that stock for cash, given Berkshire’s 
basis of $336 million and a market value of $4.7 billion, 
would have triggered a tax of $1.66 billion.109 Despite tax 
advantages, all such transactions reflect Berkshire’s 
longstanding fundamental values, which drive the 
decisions.110 
Small companies might be the alter egos of their owners, 
as the Supreme Court held in the Hobby Lobby case, saying 
they have constitutional rights to the free exercise of 
religion.111 But large companies like Berkshire are not the 
dummies of their leaders and corporate decisions are not 
political statements. In running Berkshire, Buffett has a 
fiduciary duty. It requires him to make decisions based on 
 
108 See Antoine Gara, Berkshire May Avoid $400 Million Tax Bill in 
Graham Holdings Swap, THESTREET (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.the 
street.com/story/12529683/1/berkshire-may-avoid-400-million-tax-bill-in-
graham-holdings-swap.html [http://perma.cc/XZQ8-RVLE]. 
109 See Allan Sloan, It’s Not Hard to Close the Cash-Rich Split-Off 
Loophole, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/its-not-hard-to-close-the-cash-rich-split-off-loophole/20 
15/01/21/87da04ae-9dcb-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html [https://per 
ma.cc/RP62-7LNM]; Steve Jordon, Stock-For-Company Duracell Deal 




110 See Adam Shell, Buffett Snaps Up Duracell from P&G, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 13, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/ 
11/13/buffett-snaps-up-duracell-from-pg [http://perma.cc/L6WX-FWEY] 
(quoting the author to the foregoing effect and adding the example of 
Berkshire’s swap of a minority stake in Phillips 66 for all assets of a 
pipeline lubricant business). 
111 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 
(2014). 
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what is best for Berkshire, not on whether they are 
consistent with his views on tax fairness or other political 
convictions. Given its size, it is no surprise that Berkshire 
shareholders are diverse politically and, while most concur 
with Berkshire policies and Buffett’s business philosophy, 
they do not invariably agree with Buffett’s political views.112 
The alter ego phenomenon has produced both Berkshire’s 
greatest value and ultimate cost: Buffett made the company 
great and his eventual departure raises questions about 
succession in a way that other executive succession plans do 
not. Berkshire cannot be replicated, and the man cannot be 
replaced. Critics say the company cannot survive without 
him. For example, The Economist wrote, as Buffett became 
an octogenarian, that Berkshire was down to “playing out 
the last hand,” contending that in holding the contrary view, 
I am “too easily convinced . . . .”113 Steven Davidoff Solomon 
in The New York Times lamented that Buffett graced 
Berkshire with an irreplaceable magic touch.114 At 
Berkshire’s 2013 annual meeting, investor Douglas Kass 
asserted his belief that Berkshire is no more likely to survive 
without Buffett than Teledyne was without Henry 
Singleton.115 
 
112 See Luciana Lopez, Where Shareholders Disagree with Buffett: 
Politics, REUTERS (May 4, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/talesfromthetrail/ 
2015/05/04/where-shareholders-disagree-with-buffett-politics [http://per 
ma.cc/2HGL-5EB3]. 
113 See Berkshire Hathaway: Playing Out the Last Hand, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601240-
warren-buffetts-50-years-running-berkshire-hathaway-have-been-one-
businesss-most-impressive [http://perma.cc/94VX-BW67]; Berkshire 
Hathaway: The Post-Buffett World, ECONOMIST (Jan. 10, 2015), http:// 
www.economist.com/news/business-books-quarterly/21638099-succession-
biggest-challenge-post-buffett-world [http://perma.cc/L3Z3-YMP8]. 
114 Steven Davidoff Solomon, With His Magic Touch, Buffett May Be 
Irreplaceable for Berkshire, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 21, 2013, 6:50 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/buffett-with-his-magic-touch-
may-be-irreplaceable/ [http://perma.cc/74T7-LLGQ]. 
115 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, For Buffett, the Past Isn’t Always 
Prologue, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 6, 2013, 9:23 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/for-buffett-the-past-isnt-always-
prologue/ [http://perma.cc/93E3-32RD]. 
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If the critics are right, that is a huge cost. Even if they 
prove incorrect, the fact that such a perception is widely held 
is a modest cost.  
F. Miscellaneous: Public Family Firms and The 
Tenure Myth 
Certain problems and costs are not easy to classify and 
there may be costs other than those identified above that 
warrant attention. For one, as taught by the Dexter and Gen 
Re deals, using cash avoids amplifying the cost of mistaken 
acquisitions. While undoubtedly beneficial, this feature of 
the Berkshire model also presents a cost that manifests 
whenever paying stock would produce advantages in a 
transaction. That happens when the selling shareholders 
value stock more than cash. For example, where selling 
shareholders’ tax basis is low, receiving shares defers 
significant taxes that would be due if sold for cash. 
The cost to Berkshire of preferring paying in cash rather 
than stock is most acute in the context of targets that are 
publicly traded family businesses. Family businesses appeal 
to Berkshire as they often bring a sense of legacy and 
permanence that is central to the Berkshire business model. 
Many families prize Berkshire’s commitments to autonomy 
and permanence, often selling to Berkshire for less than 
rival bids or intrinsic value. For family businesses owned 
solely by close-knit groups who all wish to sell to Berkshire, 
the cash preference at a discount creates no problems. 
But problems arise for publicly traded family businesses. 
When directors of such companies sell control, they are duty-
bound to get the best value for shareholders.116 In a stock 
deal where all holders share gains in future business value, 
those directors could consider Berkshire’s special culture in 
valuing the transaction.117 But with cash, all such future 
value goes to Berkshire’s shareholders, not the target’s 
 
116 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
117 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1151 (Del. 1989). 
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public stockholder, who would also gain nothing from the 
autonomy or permanence that family members prize in a 
sale to Berkshire. So target directors will resist an all-cash 
sale at a discount and seek rival suitors at higher prices, 
even stimulating an auction to drive price up—repelling 
Berkshire, which avoids auctions.118 
An example can be drawn from Berkshire’s 2003 
acquisition of Clayton Homes, a publicly traded family 
business bought for a modest (seven percent) premium to 
market. Many Clayton shareholders objected; one, Cerberus 
Capital Management, told Clayton it wanted the chance to 
make a competing bid; another sued.119 The result was a six-
month delay in getting to a shareholder vote, which narrowly 
approved the Berkshire deal.120 
Many Clayton shareholders were disappointed, but 
Cerberus opted not to outbid Berkshire, and the court 
dismissed the lawsuit.121 The scenario remains unattractive 
to Berkshire, however, given the risk of litigation, delay, and 
rival bids. Under Berkshire’s acute aversion to bidding in 
any auction, the risk of an auction would be enough to deter 
Berkshire from bidding at all. The upshot: the publicly 
traded family business is outside Berkshire’s acquisition 
model, amounting to an opportunity cost for what would 
otherwise be a sweet spot. 
 
118 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, 
Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/M94G-YE9F] (“We don’t participate in auctions.”). 
119 See Denver Area Meat Cutters & Emp’rs Pension Plan v. Clayton, 
209 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Denver Area Meat Cutters v. 
Clayton, 120 S.W.3d 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
120 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Buffett Wins Battle to Buy Clayton Homes, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/31/business/ 
buffett-wins-battle-to-buy-clayton-homes.html [http://perma.cc/XN3R-
X2F9]. 
121 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 
61–62. 
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Another miscellaneous cost category concerns the myth of 
the permanent manager at Berkshire.122 Berkshire prides 
itself on the long tenure of its senior managers. But besides 
highly-publicized departures such as those described earlier, 
there are numerous quieter ones. In each of a dozen cases, 
the frustrating fact is opacity about causes or resolutions. 
Berkshire offers little or nothing by way of commentary and 
the executives are mum, perhaps owing to contractual 
commitments in severance agreements or, more likely, in 
light of Berkshire culture, out of a sense of loyalty. 
Some low-key executive departures include the following. 
In the 1990s, Fechheimer Brothers Co., a uniform maker, 
had a series of presidents, including Richard Bentley, 
promoted from Scott Fetzer. In 1998, Bentley resigned from 
Fechheimer without comment by him or Berkshire. He was 
succeeded by Patrick Byrne, who stayed just two years.123 In 
2003, Sheila O’Connell Cooper, chief executive of Pampered 
Chef, Ltd., left after five months on the job without a 
trace.124 In 2006, Barry Tatelman withdrew from 
management of Jordan’s Furniture to embark on a career in 
the arts, leaving his brother Eliot in charge.125 
In 2007, soon after Sokol joined the board of Johns 
Manville, its CEO Steven B. Hochhauser was replaced by a 
MidAmerican Energy colleague, Todd M. Raba, who stayed 
only until 2012.126 Finally, in 2012, Larson-Juhl’s long-time 
 
122 See ROBERT P. MILES, THE WARREN BUFFETT CEO: SECRETS FROM 
THE BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY MANAGERS 357–58 (2003). 
123 Geert De Lombaerde, Fechheimer President Exits, CINCINNATI BUS. 
COURIER (May 16, 1998), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/ 
1998/03/16/story5.html [http://perma.cc/AH87-7QWK]; ANDREW 
KILPATRICK, OF PERMANENT VALUE: THE STORY OF WARREN BUFFETT 438 
(2011). 
124 See KAREN LINDER, THE WOMEN OF BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY: LESSONS 
FROM WARREN BUFFETT’S FEMALE CEOS AND DIRECTORS 93 (2012). 
125 Keith Reed, Bowing Out at Jordan’s, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2006), 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/12/22/bowing_out_at_jordan
s/ [http://perma.cc/A7VH-Z2FJ]. 
126 Vanessa Small, New at the Top, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/new-at-the-top-to-
meet-warren-buffett-this-outdoorsman-didnt-stay-lost-in-the-
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chief Steve McKenzie was replaced by Drew Van Pelt, newly-
minted Harvard MBA, who had no experience in the 
industry. Apparently, Van Pelt was a choice of Tracy Britt 
Cool (who subsequently became chief executive of Pampered 
Chef).127 
G. Coda: Partnership Manqué 
Berkshire annual meetings once drew a few hundred 
people who, along with Buffett, owned a decisive majority of 
the stock. They felt the genuine bonds of a true partnership. 
Today, the meeting draws more than 40,000 out of nearly 
one million shareholders. Buffett’s interest is now down to a 
third, and the inner core group’s holdings are unlikely to 
exceed a majority. Buffett continues to talk about Berkshire 
having a corporate form with a partnership attitude. But it is 
only an attitude and it no longer genuinely reflects a true 
partnership. 
The shareholders have signaled surprisingly close to 
unanimity on dividend policy.128 But discussions with 
shareholders indicate a greater division of opinion.129 You 
can expect once Buffett leaves the scene that some 
shareholders will become active in seeking policy changes, 
including some touching on the Berkshire model. While the 
dividend policy remains a plus without a cost, the 
disagreements over it might be classified as a cost. It arises 




127 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 
193–94. 
128 CONVERSATIONS FROM THE BUFFETT ESSAYS SYMPOSIUM 24–25 
(Lawrence A. Cunningham ed., forthcoming 2016) (Buffett exchange with 
Cunningham indicating results of an early 1990s precatory Berkshire 
shareholder resolution overwhelmingly supporting Berkshire’s dividend 
policy); THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 198 (reporting 
results of a 2013 precatory shareholder resolution on Berkshire dividend 
policy with 98% of the shares voting favoring the no dividend policy). 
129 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 
208. 
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through major stock-based acquisitions, including Gen Re 
and especially BNSF, as well as Dexter, Dairy Queen, and 
others. Ultimately, as with all other costs of the Berkshire 
model, it emanates from principle number one, which is 
conceiving of the corporation as a partnership.  
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PEERS AND POLICY 
Beyond the important upshot of this analysis for 
Berkshire Hathaway are lessons for policymakers and 
others. The Berkshire model successfully emerged despite 
bucking five powerful trends affecting the rest of corporate 
America that cut in the opposite direction. These are: the 
rise of the independent director and monitoring board; the 
decline of executive power; the elevation of internal controls 
to a first-order policy option; the eclipse of the conglomerate 
form; and the proliferation of shareholder activism and 
hostile takeovers. The Berkshire model’s success strengthens 
the case against these features and their rigidity. As with 
the previous Part, this one opens with a chart depicting 
highlights, here comparing five major issues that distinguish 
Berkshire from prevailing practice in corporate America, 
along with the important implications of the contrast. 
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A. Governance and Culture 
The most general implication of Berkshire’s model for 
public policy is to preserve the possibility for variation in 
governance design and business structure. This implication 
spans many topics, including the character and duties of the 
board of directors, the strength of corporate chief executives, 
and the degree of organizational direction harnessed by trust 
versus control. American policies on all such topics have 
taken directions during the past thirty years that are the 
opposite of the direction Berkshire has taken.  
1. Board Role 
During the latter half of Berkshire’s rise to prominence, 
boards of American companies shifted from the advisory 
model to the monitoring model as people from multiple 
vantage points heralded the outside director as the solution 
to governance challenges.130 The rise of independent 
directors displaced the importance of expertise and obscured 
the traits Berkshire boasts in its directors, especially owner-
orientation, understanding of business, and commitment to 
Berkshire’s prosperity. These policy paths were driven 
largely by periodic needs to quell political disputes or 
respond to crises. The appeal to independence helped 
generate consensus while devaluing expertise.131 
Director independence remains a valued characteristic in 
corporate governance, but expertise is making a comeback. 
Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act all but requires financial 
expertise on the board,132 and the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
130 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal 
Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 469–70 
(2008). 
131 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s 
Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 381 
(2002). 
132 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–66 (2012)); 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5) 
(2014) (Item 407(d)(5) of Regulation S-K); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-3 (2014) 
(SEC Rule 10A-3). 
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contemplates a similar approach to compensation 
committees.133 As my colleague and now Securities and 
Exchange Commission Commissioner Lisa Fairfax has 
explained, there is a case for the inside director, even if an 
uneasy one.134 The Berkshire model proves both the value of 
expertise and the value of having some deliberative body 
available to handle crises (e.g., the Sokol-Lubrizol affair135) 
and to steer the business during transitions (Buffett is 
relying heavily on the Berkshire board to assure continuity 
after he leaves the scene).136 The Berkshire model suggests 
that there are both reasons to have a board and reasons to 
oppose its primacy.137 Berkshire shows that a corporation 
can thrive with an advisory board of the old-fashioned model. 
2. CEO Power 
Before the 1990s, CEOs wielded substantial power, 
selecting the directors and enjoying the latitude that comes 
with deferential or passive shareholders. The rise of the 
independent board and of shareholder activism changed this 
dynamic, as boards and owners gained influence and 
exercised it to curtail executive power. The long-term effects 
of such a shift are yet to crystalize, but are likely to be 
 
133 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10c-1 (2014) (SEC Rule 10c-l). 
134 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 127 (2010). 
135 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
136 See THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 296 
(discussing Berkshire’s future and stressing that Berkshire has “an 
extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors 
ready to carry out [its] promise of partnership”). 
137 Compare Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2011) (arguing for the abolition of the 
corporate board as anachronistic), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547, 550 (2003) (arguing that the corporate board should wield 
considerable power at the apex of the corporate hierarchy). 
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sweeping.138 The Berkshire model is a reminder of the value 
of executive power and a cautionary note about such broad 
scale change. Indeed, in his role as chief executive, Buffett 
has avoided the trap of other icons, who may be prone to 
vanity or licentiousness, proving that such flaws are not 
inevitable.139 Berkshire’s plan to divide Buffett’s historical 
roles as chairman and chief executive between two 
individuals shows the appeal of governance design flexibility 
for different contexts—uniting the roles is best during 
Buffett’s tenure but dividing them seems better post-
Buffett.140  
3. Control Versus Trust 
Over the past four decades, corporate internal controls 
became a first-order policy option to respond to a wide 
variety of national problems, from financial fraud to terrorist 
financing.141 Despite their proliferation as regulatory tools to 
address issues ranging from consumer price gouging to 
worker safety and environmental protection, it is difficult to 
evaluate whether controls work and are worth their 
considerable cost.142 
Corporate controls began as internal processes with 
positive aspirations of helping a corporation meet its 
objectives, a conception creating modest expectations of 
 
138 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 987, 1041 (2010) (cataloging dozens of profound implications ranging 
from regulatory backlash to international corporate convergence). 
139 See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 351, 366–67, 375 (2011) (suggesting that iconic 
CEOs win too much organizational and legal deference (citing Steve Jobs), 
are prone to overconfidence (citing Buffett) and even licentiousness (citing 
Michael Eisner)). 
140 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
141 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal 
Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 268 
(2004). 
142 See generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF 
VERIFICATION (1999) (describing the complexity and high cost of auditing 
regimes). 
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results. When used as a leading policy option, however, 
controls assume a negative character. They become processes 
designed to prevent certain undesired events from occurring, 
a conception doomed to disappointed expectations. Controls 
are inherently limited in what they can do, making the 
modest expectations associated with positive aspirational 
controls sensible but increasing the likelihood of 
disappointed expectations associated with the more 
ambitious efforts of negative preventive controls. 
Systemic forces make controls an attractive policy option. 
The rise of the board monitoring model played an important 
role, as controls dovetailed with such oversight.143 
Movements for deregulation and cooperative compliance 
made controls appealing as alternatives to direct regulation. 
Resistance to federal preemption of state law makes controls 
an attractive way to inject federal policy into corporate 
affairs. The corporate social responsibility movement 
demands greater accountability; controls addressing 
interests of particular constituencies seem tailor-made for 
the purpose. An entire compliance industry arose, led by 
auditors and lawyers who developed expertise in the design, 
implementation, and testing of controls. 
Yet these forces often resulted in controls that appear to 
work and can be audited rather than controls that work in 
fact.144 The result: corporate America tends to expect far 
more from internal controls than such systems can deliver. 
The Berkshire experience, using minimalist controls in favor 
of heavy reliance on trust, demonstrates that controls are not 
necessary to promote compliance or other desirable 
outcomes. Policymakers should be willing to tolerate more 
trust-based corporate cultures than the prevailing climate 
favoring control permits. But even Berkshire maintains a 
 
143 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal 
Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 238–39 (1997). 
144 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
CUNNINGHAM – FINAL  
No. 1:1] BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES 49 
system of internal control over financial reporting because, 
as Buffett joked, “no sense being a damned fool.”145 
Still, the overwhelming principles of corporate 
governance and culture at Berkshire Hathaway are 
responsibility and trust. Such a model stands in sharp 
contrast to prevailing views among theorists and norms 
among practitioners.146 The theorists assume pervasive 
agency costs—managers acting with self-interest in 
derogation of owner interests—and many managers do in 
fact exhibit such behavior.147 Yet not all do, and Berkshire 
has a whole cadre of managers operating in the opposite 
manner. David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan of Stanford 
University summed up the implications with a poignancy 
and a question: “The operating principles of Berkshire 
Hathaway are in stark contrast to the ‘best practices’ 
recommended by governance experts. What does this say 
about the reliability of those best practices?”148 
B. The Conglomerate Form 
Despite Berkshire’s blemishes, the company avoided the 
major pitfalls of its form of business organization—the 
conglomerate, which was fashionable when Buffett began 
running Berkshire in 1965 but gradually and steadily faded 
from fashion while Berkshire prospered and perfected the 
model. 
 
145 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, 
Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9 
4G-YE9F]. 
146 See Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 250. 
147 See James P. Holdcroft, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Flexibility in 
Determining the Role of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 296 (1997). 
148 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Berkshire Hathaway: The Role of 
Trust in Governance (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. Closer Look Series, 
May 28, 2010), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/cgri-closer-look-02-berkshire-hathaway.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP26-
AUQR]. 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, the conglomerate form of 
business organization flourished in corporate America, in 
part due to enactment in 1950 of the Celler-Kefauver Act, 
which discouraged mergers among rivals, stimulating 
acquisitions of unrelated businesses.149 Massive companies 
were built through numerous diverse acquisitions by 
powerful chief executives. One prominent example is ITT 
Corporation which, under the leadership of Harold Geneen 
and later Rand Araskog, boasted 350 different companies, 
including baking, car rentals, hotels, and insurance.150 
Another example is Teledyne Technologies, Inc., assembled 
by Henry Singleton as nearly 100 different businesses 
encompassing acoustic speakers, aeronautics, banking, 
computers, engines, and insurance.151 By 1980, the majority 
of Fortune 500 companies were conglomerates.152 Rationales 
included exploiting scale, seizing synergies, spreading 
managerial acumen, and diversifying investments. 
But critics perceived indulgent empire building by 
imperious executives as many of these businesses struggled, 
incurred significant losses for sustained periods, 
misallocated capital internally, or otherwise proved difficult 
to manage.153 Under pressure from hostile corporate 
 
149 See Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Hostile 
Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 55–56 (1990), 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/hostile_takeovers_80s.pdf?m=
1360042383 [http://perma.cc/T63S-BA6S]. 
150 See generally ROBERT SOBEL, ITT: THE MANAGEMENT OF 
OPPORTUNITY (2d ed. 2000) (documenting the multiple companies that ITT 
invested in at various points). 
151 See generally GEORGE A. ROBERTS WITH ROBERT J. MCVICKER, 
DISTANT FORCE: A MEMOIR OF THE TELEDYNE CORPORATION AND THE MAN 
WHO CREATED IT (2007) (documenting the multiple companies that 
Teledyne invested in). 
152 Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate 
Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 
59 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 553 (1995). 
153 THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 15, at 287 (discussing 
Buffett’s account of the poor reputation of the conglomerate business 
model and how the Berkshire model differs). 
CUNNINGHAM – FINAL  
No. 1:1] BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES 51 
takeover artists seeking to maximize shareholder value as 
well as academics urging greater focus, the conglomerate 
model began to unravel. Raiders such as Carl Icahn and 
Ronald Perelman and buyout firms such as Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts targeted or acquired conglomerates and proceeded to 
break them up while others, like ITT and Teledyne, simply 
succumbed to the changing times and divided into multiple 
discrete corporations.154 
By 1990, the era of the conglomerates was over, and 
widely viewed as a systemic mistake. Top executives prone to 
conglomerate-wide systems and micromanagement 
ultimately undermined operational success. Subsidiary 
managers could execute more effectively when permitted to 
apply systems tailored to the needs of their business and 
focused on areas within their unique expertise. Boards of 
directors, increasingly called upon as active monitors of 
managers rather than loyal advisors, could not oversee 
sprawling empires. Shareholders could diversify for 
themselves more efficiently than conglomerate executives 
who proved inept at allocating capital. And U.S. antitrust 
policy had swung back in the direction of solicitude toward 
mergers among rivals.155 
During this same period, however, Berkshire transformed 
itself from a small investment partnership in the 1960s into 
a diversified conglomerate with vast stock holdings by 1995. 
Today, it is a conglomerate more sprawling than ITT, 
Teledyne, or any of the other colossuses of the 1980s, such as 
Beatrice, Gulf & Western, Litton, or Textron. And its 
performance is peerless. One broad reason for this success is 
that Berkshire recognized and avoided all the pitfalls: 
Buffett, as chief executive, is the opposite of a micromanager; 
Berkshire’s decentralization and principle of managerial 
 
154 See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE 
VALUE 168 (1998) (“The documented behavior of successful conglomerates 
shows that they tended to be opportunistic buyers but reluctant sellers of 
companies. So long as constituent business units continued to meet 
minimal corporate performance criteria, they were unlikely to be sold.”). 
155 See Davis et al., supra note 152, at 554. 
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autonomy enables managerial focus; Buffett’s investment 
acumen made Berkshire’s practice of diversification valuable 
to investors; and Berkshire’s internal capital allocation saved 
stockholders sizable transaction costs and taxes. 
Berkshire was not the only conglomerate to prosper amid 
the anti-conglomerate environment of recent decades. 
Several other thriving conglomerates stand out among 
widely-held public companies. A venerable case is General 
Electric, whose divisions span aviation, energy management, 
jet engines, light bulbs, and water. Despite a recent 
downsizing to focus more on industrial businesses—divesting 
its appliances, capital, and real estate businesses—the 
moves were not anti-conglomerate, but were instead a 
divestiture of businesses not meeting minimum profit 
thresholds,156 and the banking business had become newly 
regulated by Dodd-Frank.157 In fact, the company remained 
committed to potential acquisitions that would sustain the 
conglomerate model.158 Another example is United 
Technologies, a lower-profile company operating a diverse 
group of iconic brands such as Carrier air conditioning, Otis 
elevator, Pratt & Whitney engines, and Sikorsky 
helicopters.159 
 
156 See Ted Mann & Erin McCarthy, GE Plans to Divest More 
Businesses; Profit, Revenue Decline, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2014, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036268045795053815994
50134 [http://perma.cc/Z7N4-X4FW]. 
157 JoAnn S. Lublin et al., GE Seeks Exit from Banking Business, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2015, 6:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-
prepared-to-exit-the-bulk-of-ge-capital-1428662109 [http://perma.cc/U28W 
-75R7]; Justin Fox, Is GE Capital A Dodd-Frank Victim?, BLOOMBERGVIEW 
(Apr. 10, 2015, 2:50 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-
10/ge-blazes-a-path-for-the-financial-giants-to-follow [http://perma.cc/MV 
F6-S2FM]. 
158 See Mann & McCarthy, supra note 156. 
159 See Our Businesses At A Glance, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, 
http://www.utc.com/Our-Businesses/Pages/At-A-Glance.aspx [http://perma. 
cc/UR9K-CJX2]. Yet another example is Honeywell International Inc. See 
Ted Mann, Conglomerate Honeywell Finds Love Amid the Breakups, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2015, 12:53 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/conglomerate-
honeywell-finds-love-amid-the-breakups-1441156184 [http://perma.cc/4C 
7S-5STK]. 
CUNNINGHAM – FINAL  
No. 1:1] BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES 53 
Conglomerates also continue to flourish among closely-
held companies or public companies with controlling 
shareholders. An example of the latter is Danaher 
Corporation, a Fortune 500 company run by Mitchell and 
Steven Rales operating in numerous sectors, including 
dental equipment, life sciences, environmental technologies, 
industrial tools, and precision instruments. Among closely-
held conglomerates, an exemplar is the Marmon Group, a 
classic and massive conglomerate built by Jay and Bob 
Pritzker during the conglomerate boom and afterwards—and 
acquired by Berkshire in 2006. 
Today, an entire sector is reviving the conglomerate 
model, led by technology behemoths such as Amazon, 
Facebook, and Google. The movement is epitomized by the 
conscious decision of Google to reorganize as Alphabet Inc. to 
arrange the growing diversity of its businesses.160 
Generating abundant cash from its primary search business, 
Google has expanded into many fields, although they pivot 
around highly-innovative technology: Android, Chrome, 
Nest, YouTube, and the driverless car business. Google is 
consciously mimicking Berkshire in adopting an 
autonomous, decentralized, and trust-based organizational 
model, and its origins resemble those of General Electric. A 
century ago, GE’s leadership viewed electricity the way 
Google’s leadership sees technology: as a transformative 
force driving pervasive change in commerce, education, home 
life, and society at large.161 
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Berkshire—along with such companies as Danaher, 
General Electric, and United Technologies—proved that the 
conglomerate model can succeed when based on principles 
such as autonomy and permanence—the practice of 
acquiring diverse high-quality businesses and then 
nurturing and retaining them through thick and thin. 
Google—along with the likes of Amazon and Facebook—has 
the opportunity to extend the proof and the lessons. The 
lesson from Berkshire for such emulators is not only that the 
model can work, but to expose some of the challenges and 
blemishes that must be either addressed or tolerated.  
C.  Activism, Hostility, and Defense 
Long before the era of the conglomerate, during the 
period examined in the classic text by Berle and Means, 
corporations were thought of as perpetual—enduring 
institutions such as Berkshire.162 But as the conglomerate 
era was eclipsed by the takeover era, corporations became 
more transient, in perception and fact.163 Transience is 
today’s prevailing mindset too, sustained by those committed 
to pressuring corporations to deliver immediate shareholder 
results, whether it is shareholder activists, hedge funds, or 
private equity firms. The latter approach acquisitions very 
differently than Berkshire: they are highly leveraged, deeply 
interventionist, heavily intermediated, and short-term by 
design.164 
Conglomerates, therefore, remain out of fashion, primed 
to attract hostility requiring strong defenses. While the best 
defense is solid and sustained economic performance, 
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and Google—is large block shareholdings.165 No raider 
during the heyday of the hostile takeover and no shareholder 
activist today would consider targeting Berkshire.166 Indeed, 
Buffett famously aligned with the defenders of corporate 
bastions during the 1980s hostile takeover wave, as 
Berkshire provided takeover defense to companies such as 
Gillette by acquiring substantial convertible preferred stock 
and, in the case of Scott Fetzer, acquired the entire company 
as a white knight to defeat a hostile bid.167 
But the calculus may differ after Buffett departs from the 
scene. After all, despite a market capitalization of nearly a 
half-trillion dollars, many analysts calculate that Berkshire 
is worth more—that the sum of the parts is greater than the 
whole and certainly substantial multiples of book value.168 
Indeed, Berkshire invariably recovers its purchase price on 
acquisitions and investments rapidly, amid rising economic 
goodwill, while recording acquisitions at cost less 
depreciation, driving a huge wedge between intrinsic value 
and book value.169 
Citing criticisms of the conglomerate business model, 
activists will urge Buffett’s successors to sell Berkshire’s 
struggling units, spin off the mediocre ones, and install new 
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managers at some.170 In the process, activists would call for 
distributing cash to shareholders. They would explain how 
the net effect of such sales and distributions would increase 
immediate value for shareholders. 
The counterargument will stress the long-term value for 
Berkshire shareholders of ironclad pledges to business 
sellers of a permanent home offering managerial autonomy 
and an environment in which vast amounts of capital can be 
moved from one subsidiary to another without taxes or 
transaction fees.171 The economic value of such commitments 
and flexibility is not necessarily reflected in Berkshire’s 
prevailing stock price or the valuations of individual 
subsidiaries. The premium may only manifest itself when 
Berkshire makes an acquisition and be preserved only by 
sustaining the conglomerate. 
Beyond the merits of such a debate, the defenses 
available to a corporation facing such activism will assume 
some importance, meaning that the Berkshire model may 
also offer lessons about the market for corporate control—the 
world of takeovers. Berkshire’s corporate governance 
insulates it from activist shareholder agitation, starting with 
its dual class capital structure. Such structures are 
controversial if adopted as a takeover defense when they 
coerce stockholders to choose liquidity in exchange for 
surrendering control or in general because of the disparity 
between economic and voting rights. 
But Berkshire’s structure was adopted two decades ago to 
protect its shareholders by deterring intermediaries from 
creating trusts hawking fractional interests in the stock.172 
Still, the Class A shares—where Buffett and other long-time 
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owners hold most of their stakes—command a significant 
multiple of the vote compared to the Class B shares.173 After 
Buffett’s death, his bloc, currently at thirty-four percent of 
the vote, will be gradually sold over as many as ten years, 
providing his legatees with enduring though incrementally 
waning control.174 
Berkshire’s charter provides for the annual election of 
every board seat, making it theoretically possible for an 
insurgent to gain control of a majority in a single year. To 
check that, consideration might be given now to amending 
the charter, by board and shareholder vote, to opt for a 
staggered board with three classes of directors each serving 
three-year terms. That would promote continuity and 
independence while demanding greater patience from 
activists. It would also be a controversial move, however, as 
the recent debate over classified boards drew impassioned 
views on the subject.175 Berkshire has never had, but has 
never needed, a classified board; its culture and history are 
congruent with a classified board.176  
 
173 Today, Class A shares have one vote per share and an equivalent 
claim to the economic interest such as dividends while the Class B shares 
have 1/10,000 of that voting power and 1/1500 of that economic interest. 
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D. Emulation 
Many people are interested in replicating Berkshire 
Hathaway, from the current leadership of Google to smaller 
insurance companies such as Markel Corporation, which has 
consciously mimicked the model quite successfully on a 
lesser scale. Many Berkshire subsidiaries are themselves 
conglomerates, genuine mini-Berkshires including not only 
Marmon and Scott Fetzer but also Berkshire Hathaway 
Energy, MiTek, and Precision Castparts. Business people 
dream of creating conglomerates in Berkshire’s image in 
much the same way proverbial literary types want to write 
the next best-selling novel. And it can be done, if not on the 
same scale or to the same degree. More modest aspirations 
would emulate some of Berkshire’s principles and practices, 
especially those of autonomy, decentralization, permanence, 
self-reliance, and trust. 
Adapting the Berkshire model can create a competitive 
advantage versus rivals in the acquisition market, from 
strategic buyers to private equity firms. GE, for example, 
cannot offer autonomy or permanence. It is very acquisitive, 
but nearly as prone to divestitures—former CEO Jack Welch 
became famous for closing or selling any subsidiary that 
failed to lead its industry and Jeff Immelt executed a 
significant divestiture program. Private equity firms are 
interventionist by strategy and short-term by design. They 
create funds with ten-year lives (five to sow then five to reap) 
and immediately alter target managers, cultures, 
workforces, and production facilities to prepare the company 
for resale.177 
Above all and for every public company, the most 
important lesson from Berkshire is the value of a long-term 
outlook. When public company managers are hounded by 
analysts and activist shareholders about results in the 
current quarter and year-to-date, the pressure to focus on 
the short-term is intense. Cutting costs today and 
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maximizing revenue now easily entail a sacrifice in future 
economic gain. The gains from withstanding short-term 
pressure to focus on results over the coming several years 
compound over time. The best emulators of Berkshire are 
companies and managers who earn reputations for serious 
long-term focus by achieving high average annual returns 
over rolling periods of five and ten years. That can be done in 
many different ways, using a variety of board structures, 
management techniques, and corporate cultures—all of 
which have costs as well as benefits and of which many 
varieties should be allowed to flourish.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
People often say one’s best quality is also one’s worst 
quality and the same goes for Buffett and the Berkshire 
model he minted. It has been a huge plus for him to control 
investments and acquisitions, hire managers and give them 
autonomy in a decentralized structure—and those are the 
source of substantially all the costs of the Berkshire model as 
well. For others certainly, and maybe even for Buffett, easing 
up on the model in favor of a degree of the more conventional 
approaches might reduce some costs while sacrificing less in 
the way of gains. There is no reason to second-guess Buffett 
but every reason to believe that his successors will be drawn 
to making some adjustments. 
But Berkshire and other companies should be permitted 
to devise the governance and organizational structures that 
work for them, whether the advisory or monitoring board, 
powerful or constrained executives, trust or control based 
cultures, and concentrated or diversified business 
organizations. While even Berkshire can improve, it shows 
that, warts and all, the conventional wisdom in corporate 
governance and practice is not always efficient or wise. 
 
